The School Segregation Cases: A Comment by Sanders, Paul H.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 7 
Issue 5 Issue 5 - August 1954 Article 18 
8-1954 
The School Segregation Cases: A Comment 
Paul H. Sanders 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Education Law Commons, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul H. Sanders, The School Segregation Cases: A Comment, 7 Vanderbilt Law Review 985 (1954) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol7/iss5/18 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASES: A COMMENT
PAUL H. SANDERS*
Segregation in the public schools on the basis of race or color
pursuant to law has been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court of the United States.' Such segregation, the Court says, violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States. The unanimous opinions of the Court delivered by
Chief Justice Warren, declare this to be so regardless of the "equality"
of the "tangible factors" in such educational facilities. This action, of
paramount significance during the term just ended, will have a sequel
of virtually equal moment next term, since the framing of decrees in
the cases 'has been set down for further argument then. Coupled with
the Court's failure to decide these cases during the 1952 term,2 there
will thus have been afforded an outstanding example of judicial
deliberateness in dealing with an emotionally charged problem. That
this decision of our highest court will have a tremendous impact upon
the laws and legal institutions of Tennessee is obvious.3 The under-
standing of it will be aided, it is believed, by some consideration of
the broader legal developments which have brought us to this result.
A reading of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment with little
more historical knowledge than the dates of its proposal and effective-
ness would lead inevitably to the conclusion that its primary purpose
must have been to accord constitutional protection against the states
to the recently-freed slaves. All persons were declared to be citizens
of their state as well as of the United States. The privileges and im-
munities of citizenship were not to be abridged by the state. The
regular procedures of the law (due process) were to be followed when
persons were deprived of life, liberty or property by the state. A state
could not deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal avail-
ability and protection of its laws and legal institutions. Study of the
historical materials reenforces what the text suggests-a basic purpose
to secure equality of treatment before the law for members of the
Negro race.
4
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Briggs v. Elliott, Davis v. County
School Board of Prince Edward County, Gebhart v. Belton, 347 U.S. 483, 74
Sup. Ct. 686 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 Sup. Ct. 693 (1954).
2. 345 U.S. 972, 73 Sup. Ct. 1114, 97 L. Ed. 1388 (1953).
3. Segregation of the white and colored races is required by the Tennessee
Constitution and statutes. TENN. CONST. Art XI, § 12, TENx. CODE ANN. §§
11395-11397 (Williams 1934).
4. See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?, 2 STANFoIm L. REV. 5, 138-39 (1949); Frank and Munro, The Original
Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws", 50 COL. L. REv. 131, 166-69
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Within five* years from its effective date the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause of the Amendment was rendered largely meaningless
in the first decision of the United States Supreme Court interpreting
this Section.5 That decision, nevertheless, stated repeatedly and in
emphatic terms the relationship of the Amendment to the rights of
Negroes:
"We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of events, almost
too recent to be called history, but which are familiar to us all; and on
the most casual examination of the language of these amendments, no
one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in
them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of
them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the
slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the
protection of the newly-made freemen and citizen from the oppressions
of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. It
is true that only the 15th amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by
speaking of his color and his slavery. But it is just as true that each of
the other articles was addressed to the grievances of that race, and
designed to remedy them as the fifteenth."
" . . . in any fair and just construction of any section or phrase of
these' amendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have
said was the pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they were
designed to remedy, and the process of continued addition to the Consti-
tutfon until that purpose was supposed to be accomplished, as far as
constitutional law can accomplish it."7
"In the light of the history of these amendments, and the pervading
purpose of them, which we have already discussed, it is not difficult to
give a meaning to this [Equal Protection] clause. The existence of laws
in the States where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which dis-
criminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was
the evil to be remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden.
"If, however, the States did not conform their laws to its requirements,
then by the fifth section of the article of amendment Congress was
authorized to enforce it by suitable legislation. We doubt very much
whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination
against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be
held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a
provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case would be
necessary for its application to any other."s
Justice Miller proved to be a poor prophet. A case count will show
only a relative handful of cases considering the application of the
provision to discrimination by states on the basis of race or color as
(1950); Graham, The Early Antislavery Background of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 479, 610; Hyman, ,egregatzo and tne Four-
teenth Amendment, 4 VANw. L. REv. 555-73 (1951).
5. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (U.S. 1873).
6. Id. at 71-72.
7. Id. at 72.
8. Id. at 81.
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against the large number concerned with matters such as state taxes
and regulations of business.
H~owever, even after this opening up of the protection of the Amend-
ment to situations not involving Negroes, the Court has continued to
make it clear that discriminations under state law on the basis of race
or color are unconstitutional."
Equal protection, the Court has said, on many occasions, means the
protection of equal laws. 1 This does not mean that all state laws in-
volving discrimination are invalid. The question of constitutionality
of such laws is framed in terms of whether a rational basis exists for
the classification which underlies the differing treatment provided by
law.12 The Court has always held that race or color alone could never
supply such a rational basis.'3 Further the Court has made clear that
actual administration under law-not merely the wording of a state
statute (or constitution) or of a city ordinance-is determinative of
constitutional right.' 4 At the same time the Court has insisted that it
is only "state action" (including any level of government within the
state) that is protected against under the Fourteenth Amendment. 5
Merely private discrimination on the basis of race or color is said not
to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.' Congress has no
power by reason of Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to
reach and punish refusals to serve or discriminations in service on the
basis of race or color by carriers, hotel keepers or theater owners. 1
Although the Supreme Court of the United States has, in general,
refused to validate legal distinctions in the states based, expressly or
9. See CONSrrruTioN or UITED STATES OF AMERICA, REVISED AwD ANNOTATED,
1141-70 (1952).
10. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664 (1880) and Patton
v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 63 Sup. Ct. 184, 92 L. Ed. 76 (1947) (jury selection);
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 Sup. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149 (1917) (resi-
dential segregation ordinance); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 836,
92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948) (enforcement of restrictive covenant); Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 Sup. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 987 (1944).
11. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220
(1886).
12. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7 60 L. Ed. 131 (1917).
13. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 6a Sup. 6t. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948);
see Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349-50, 59 Sup. Ct. 232, 83
L. Ed. 208 (1938), which shows that race segregation laws have never been
valid except on the assumption that "substantial equality" prevailed under
them.
14. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886).
15. See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, REVISFD AND ANNOTATED 1141
(1952).
16. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835 (1883). But cf.
Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Association, 74 Sup. Ct. 783 (1954); Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948), and Rice v.
Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1947).
17. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835 (1883); but ef.
Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816, 70 Sup. Ct. 843, 94 L. Ed. 1302 (1950) ;
Steele v. L.&.N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 65 Sup. Ct. 226, 89 L. Ed. 173 (1944);
Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 72 Sup. Ct. 1022,
96 L. Ed. 1283 (1952).
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in administration, upon race or color, it did not have to deal under
the Equal Protection Clause'8 with the question of laws requiring or
permitting segregation on such bases until 1896. In Plessy v. Fergu-
son,19 decided in that year, the Court held that a state law requiring
separation of Negroes and non-Negroes in railroad cars did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause so long as the facilities were substantially
equal. The acceptance of this doctrine as applied to public education
came in Cumming v. Board of Education20 and particularly in Gong
Lum v. Rice,2' decided in 1927, although in neither of these cases was
it directly challenged.
The erosion of the "separate but equal" concept as a basis for per-
missible racial distinctions in public education began in 1938 with the
decision in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada.22 With Chief Justice
Hughes writing the opinion, the Supreme Court held that Missouri
violated the Equal Protection Clause if it accorded a qualified white
person a legal education at a state institution within its borders while
requiring a Negro applicant, similarly situated, to go elsewhere. The
tone of the opinion with its insistence upon "equality in fact" had a
quality that sets it apart from preceding cases relating to education:
"The admissibility of laws separating the races in the enjoyment of
privileges afforded by the State rests wholly upon the equality of the
privileges which the laws give to the separated groups within the State.
The question here is not of a duty of the State to supply legal training,
or of the quality of the training which it does supply, but of its duty
when it provides such training to furnish it to the residents of the State
18. But cf. Washington, Alexandria & Georgetown R.R. v. Brown, 17 Wall.
445, 84 L. Ed. 675 (U.S. 1873).
19. 163 U.S. 537, 6 Sup. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896). The majority opinion
contains language repudiated in Brown v. Board of Education: "We consider
the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption
that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a
badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the
act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon
it." 163 U.S. 537, 551. The dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan contains classic
phrases: " . . . in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste
here. Our Constitution is color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens.... [TIhe judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to
be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott
case." 163 U.S. 537, 559. See Watt and Orlikoff, The Coming Vindication of Mr.
Justice Harlan, 44 ILL. L. REv. 13 (1949).
20. 175 U.S. 528, 20 Sup. Ct. 197, 44 L. Ed. 262 (1899).
21. 275 U.S. 78, 48 Sup. Ct. 91, 72 L. Ed. 172 (1927). The opinion of Chief
Justice Taft considered the question of enforced segregation in railroad cars,
involved in Plessy v. Ferguson, to be "a more difficult question" than segrega-
tion in schools on the basis of color (made applicable here under Mississippi
law to a Chinese child.) He relied heavily upon the Massachusetts decision
in Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198 (1849), as having established the doctrine
that equality may be accorded in separate schools, and cites many other state
court decisions throughout the country to the same effect. See also Berea
College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 29 Sup. Ct. 33, 53 L. Ed. 81 (1908).
22. 305 U.S. 337, 59 Sup. Ct. 232, 83 L. Ed. 208 (1938).
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upon the basis of an equality of right. By the operation* of the laws of
Missouri a privilege has been created for white law students which is
denied to negroes by reason of their race."23
After World War II further clarification of the constitutional status
of racially-segregated educational facilities came in Sipuel v. Board of
Regents, 24 Sweatt v. Painter25 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Re-
gents.26 The United States Supreme Court found lack of factual
equality in the segregated facilities in each instance but carefully
avoided the question of whether necessarily and intrinsically educa-
tional facilities separated on the basis of race constituted a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. These cases, and lower court decisions
following them, had by the end of 1950 substantially established that
in the field of specialized higher education separate facilities did not
meet constitutional requirements because of lack of equality in the
tangible and intangible factors applicable to such specialty.27 This
same period, 1945-1950, saw much ferment in terms of ending racial
discrimination in many fields. The reports of the President's Com-
mittee on Civil Rights28 and of the Commission on Higher Education2
called for the end of racial discrimination and segregation in educa-
tion. It was a period when all distinctions on the basis of race were
getting a pretty thorough going-over from such diverse sources as
international organizations, church groups, civic groups, business con-
cerns and labor unions, as well as federal, state and local lawmaking
bodies. Constitutionally, such distinctions were suspect in a way that
had not been true previously as measured by tangible results3 0
What would have happened if substantially equal facilities at all
levels of education had in fact been provided for Negroes consistently
and as a normal pattern in those states requiring or permitting segre-
gation we shall never know. This part of the constitutional doctrine of
"separate but equal" was never implemented as a general pattern
although sbme states took their responsibilities in this regard more
23. 305 U.S. 337, 349.
24. 332 U.S. 631, 68 Sup. Ct. 299, 92 L. Ed. 247 (1948).
25. 339 U.S. 629, 70 Sup. Ct. 848, 94 L. Ed. 1114 (1950).
26. 339 U.S. 637, 70 Sup. Ct. 851, 94 L. Ed. 1149 (1950).
27. See Hyman, Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAD. L. REv.
555, 560-61 (1951); Sanders, Constitutional Law-1953 Tennessee Survey,
6 VAND. L. REV. 1159, 1173-76 (1953).
28. To SECURE THESE RIGHTS-THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, 79-87, 166 (1947).
29. PRESIDENT'S CoaInssSioN ON HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER EDUCATION FOR
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, Vol. II, c. III, pp. 25-39, 43-44 (1947).
30. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 70 Sup. Ct. 269, 94 L. Ed. 839 (1950); Hurd
v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 68 Sup. Ct. 847, 92 L. Ed. 1187 (1948); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948); Takahashi v. Fish and Game
Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 68 Sup. Ct. 1138, 92 L. Ed. 1478 (1948); Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633, 68 Sup. Ct. 269, 92 L. Ed. 249 (1948); see Morgan v.
Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 66 Sup. Ct. 1050, 90 L. Ed. 1317 (1946); cf. Rice v. El-
more, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1947).
1954]
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seriously than others.3 1 The series of cases which resulted in the
Supreme Court's decision in the instant case were instituted in 1950 in
a context of great effort at improvement in separate facilities for
Negroes.3 2 Nevertheless lack of equality in facilities provided was
found at least in the beginning of the litigation in three of the four
cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plans for correction
of these inequalities were urged as a defense in each of these instances.
In at least two instances the facilities were found to be equal before
final action was taken by the lower court. In Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation,32a the segregated elementary schools established by the Topeka
Board of Education pursuant to the permission granted by Kansas
law were found substantially equal with respect to buildings, trans-
portation, curricula and educational qualifications of teachers by the
tthree-judge Federal District- Court. This court considered that the
arrangement had a detrimental effect upon Negro children. Never-
theless, it considered that its finding of substantial equality precluded
a holding of invalidity under the controlling precedent of Plessy v.
Ferguson.
83
In the case of Briggs v. Elliott,3 4 arising from South Carolina, the
thr6e-judge Federal District Court had found the Negro schools
(elementary and high school) to be inferior to those provided in
Clarendon County for white pupils. Admission to white schools was
denied by the court pending a report as to progress made in equalizing
the facilities provided for Negro children which the court ordered.
After a remand from the Supreme Court of the United States the
district court found substantial equality in facilities or immediate plans
to provide such. It therefore dismissed the action.3 In the case from
Virginia,36 the three-judge court found inequality, ordered the provi-
sion of- substantially equal curricula and transportation, and diligence
in removing physical plant inequality. Admission to white schools
pending the carrying out of the equalization program was denied.37
1n the Delaware case,3 8 after a finding of inequality, the immediate
31. See ASHmORE, THE NEGRO AND THE SCHOOLS, Tables 8-15, pp. 153-60
(1954), for graphic illustration of disparities normally prevailing between
white and Negro schools in the South, together with the great strides made in
recent years to close the gap.
32. See AsamoRE, THE NEGRO AND THE SCHOOLS, 108-26 (1954). The regional
compact among certain states in the South covering professional education has
been a part of this effort. See Comment, Constitutionality of the Proposed
Regional Plan fof Professional Education of the Southern Negro, 1 VAND. L.
REV. 403-24 (1948).
32a. Supra note 1. For lower court decision see 98F. Supp. 797 (D. Kans.
1951).
33. Supra note 19.
34. Supra note 1.
35. 103 F. Stipp. 920 (E.D.S.C. 1952).
36. Davis V. County School Board, sgpra note 1.
37. 103 F. .Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952).
-38: Gebhart v. Belton, supra note 1.
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admission of Negro children to white schools was ordered by the
chancellor and affirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware.3 9
After hearing arguments on these cases in the 1952 Term the United
States Supreme Court set them down for reargument and requested
the Attorney General of the United States as well as others to address
themselves to a series of detailed questions. 40 On the merits of the
Equal Protection issue, the Court asked for answers to the following:
"1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the
State legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amend-
ment contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or did not under-
stand, that it would abolish segregation in public schools?
"2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying
the Fourteenth Amendment understood that compliance with it -would
require the immediate abolition of segregation inpublic schools, was it
nevertheless the understanding of the framers of the Amendment
"(a) That future Congresses might, in the exercise of their power
under section 5 of the Amendment, abolish such segregation, or',
"(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future
conditions, to construe the Amendment as abolishing such segregation
of its own force?
"3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 2(a) and (b) do
not dispose of the issue, is it within the judicial power, in construing the
Amendment, to abolish segregation in public schools?" 41
After reargument in December, 1953, the Court announced its
unanimous decision on May 17, 1954, overruling the doctrine of "sep-
arate but equal" as applied in public education at all levels. In spite
of aspects of inequality in three out of the four cases, the Court did
not seek to avoid this issue. The opinion states that the constitutional
problem does not turn on a comparison of tangible factors. The answer
to the questions set forth above are not dealt with in detail.42 Chief
Justice Warren's opinion indicates that original intentions or expec-
tations are not too illuminating or necessarily controlling:
"Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered ex-
haustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by
the states, then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of
proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our
own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light;
it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best,
39. 91 A.2d 137, affirming 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952). •
40. 345 U.S. 972, 73 Sup. Ct. 1114, 97 L. Ed. 1388 (1953); see Sanders, Con-
stitutional Law-953 Tennessee Survey, 6 VAxD. L. lxv. 1159, 1173 ,(.1953).
41. 345 U.S. 972.
42. This in spite of the fact that on the oral argument the Justices seemed




they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amend-
ments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among
"all persons born or naturalized in the United States." Their opponents,
just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the
Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What
others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be
determined with any degree of certainty."
43
The relative lack of development in public education is given as an
additional reason for lack of light as to the intentions of the framers
with respect to this particular problem. This whole aspect is con-
sidered of secondary importance:
"In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v.
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of
its full development and its present place in American life throughout the
Nation. Only, in this way can it be determined if segregation in public
schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws."
44
The opinion then proceeds to its conclusion by declaring that edu-
cation is today perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments, that it is the foundation of good citizenship and a
principal instrument in awakening cultural values, in preparing for ad-
vanced training and helping in normal adjustment to environment.
"In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be ex-
pected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an educa-
tion. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide
it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.1
40
The opinion then declares that segregation in the public schools
"solely on the basis of race" necessarily deprives the children of the
minority group of equal educational opportunities. "Separate facilities
are inherently unequal."46 The intangible considerations stressed in
the McLaurin Case47 are considered to apply with added force to the
child in grade and high school. "To separate them [by law] from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone. ' 48 The Court specifically rejects the language of Plessy v.
Ferguson4 9 that segregation involves no stamp of inferiority, accepting
the findings of psychologists and social scientists as "modern authority"
in this regard.
43. 74 Sup. Ct. 686, 688-89.
44. Id. at 691.
45. Ibid.
46. Id. at 692.
47. Supra note 26.
48. 74 Sup. Ct. 686, 691.
49. See note 19 supra.
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The Court found it unnecessary to reach the question of violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but the
companion case of Boiling v. Sharpe50 held that the segregated schools
of the District of Columbia, pursuant to Congressional enactment,
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (which
contains no mention of "equal protection"). The Court's definition of
"liberty" can be expected to have implications far beyond the facts
of this case:
"Although the Court has not assumed to define 'liberty' with any great
precision, that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint.
Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the indi-
vidual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper
governmental objective. Segregation in public education is not reasonably
related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on
Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an
arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process
Clause."51
It would be "unthinkable" the opinion concludes, that the Constitution
would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government, at the capital
of the nation, than it does on the states.
The cases, taken together, seem clear and unfaltering in their pro-
nouncement by the organ of government empowered to decide (and
to make effective the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution) .52
That pronouncement sets forth the principle that existing coristitu-
tional provisions invalidate the requiring or permitting of enforced
segregation in public education by any level of government.
For the application of this principle, even in the cases in which it
was announced, we must wait until the next term of the Court. Some
of its implications may be gleaned from action taken by the Court
on May 24, 1954 in other cases pending before it. Three of these cases
involved public education. In Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of
Control,53 an applicant for admission to the College of Law, University
of Florida, who had made no effort to show the inequality of a segre-
gated law school, had been refused a peremptory writ to compel his
admission by the supreme court of that state. In Tureaud v. Board of
Supervisors54 a petition for an injunction against the governing board
of Louisiana State University to prevent the enforcement by that body
of the provisions of Louisiana law requiring segregation was granted
by the Federal District Judge. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
50. Supra note 1.
51. 74 Sup. Ct. 693, 694-95.
52. U.S. CONST., Art. VI, cl. 2.
53. 74 Sup. Ct. 783. For facts and lower court opinion, see 60 So.2d 162.




Circuit reversed, not on. the merits, but because a three-judge court
was thought to be required. In each of these cases the applicant's
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was granted,
the judgment vacated and the case remanded for consideration in light
of the ,decision in the principal case "and conditions that now prevail."
In Wichita Falls Junior College District v. Battlef both the federal
district court (single judge) and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit had approved an injunction to prevent the controlling body of
a state junior college from excluding qualified Negro applicants resid-
ing in the district. The junior college district had taken the position
that it was compelled to exclude the applicants under the constitution
and statutes of Texas. Its petition for writ of certiorari was denied
on 'May 24, 1954.
The three other related cases disposed of on that date go beyond
the realm of education. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
had directed that the Mayor of Houston, Texas, should be enjoined
from refusing on the basis of their race to allow Negroes to make use
of municipal golf facilities. The court of appeals' judgment had pro-
vided for the preservation of segregation in such use. The Supreme
Court denied the mayor's petition for writ of certiorari.5 In Housing
Authority of the City and County of San Francisco v. Banks,57 the
District Court of Appeal in California had held that classification of
tenants on the basis of race in public low-rent housing is a denial of
Equal Protection. Plessy v. Ferguson had been distinguished by the
California court. The housing authority's petition for writ of certiorari
was denied by the Supreme Court. While the action of the Supreme
Court in each of the two cases was taken without reference to the
Segregation Cases, in Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Associationus
the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was vacated
and he case remanded for consideration in the light of the school
cases "and the conditions that now prevail." Very significantly, this
case involved the lease of an amphitheater in a city-owned park to
a privately operated enterprise where the city did not participate
either directly or indirectly in the operation of the private enterprise.
The private enterprise had refused admission to Negroes to its operatic
performance at the amphitheater during the summertime. The lower
cofurt had -held that this refusal involved no violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment although in the same case it had held that Negroes
55: 74 Sup. Ct. 783. For facts and lower court decisions, see 101 F. Supp. 82,
204 F.2d 632.
56. Holcombe v. Beal, 74 Sup. Ct. 783. For facts and lower court decisions,
see 103 F. Supp. 218, 193 F.2d 384.
57. 74 Sup. Ct. 784.




were entitled to use public golf courses and the facilities of a fishing
lake in the same park.
It is too early to attempt to gauge the full scope of the Court's
holding in the School Segregation Cases. The decision, in its choice
of words for the statement of its holding and in the reasons given to
support the holding, is limited to public education. It is not reasonable
to assume that it will be contained to this sphere overly-long as the
Louisville Park59 case indicates. On the other hand, to assume an
immediate demise for all laws involving race separation by law would
undoubtedly be premature. The facts and holding of these cases do
not indicate that the Constitution requires a compulsory intermingling
in the sense of complete integration of all educational facilities regard-
less of individual choice. Rather under the fact patterns the decision
is to the effect that race is not a constitutionally valid basis for the
exclusion from public schools of an otherwise qualified applicant who
desires to use such facilities. Obviously the decision does not invali-
date the good-faith setting up of classifications, on such accepted bases
as sex, intelligence, and choice of educational program when made
applicable without regard to race.
Finally, it must be borne in mind that there can be a vast difference
between announcement of constitutional principle and practical ap-
plication on a generally accepted basis. This is best illustrated per-
haps by the history of race discrimination in jury and grand -jury
selection where the constitutional requirement has been clearly enun-
ciated for seventy-five years or more.0 0 This is not meant to suggest,
in any way, that evasive devices can be expected to be tolerated by
the Supreme Court or that the effect of the law announced is purely
a matter of voluntary compliance. Each of these cases involved class
actions. The decrees will be fashioned at the next term, and decrees
can be enforced, but two of the defendants have apparently already
made plans to voluntarily carry out the principle announced, which
would seem the better part of wisdom for all who are affected by its
announcement. In this area, as in so many others, the ultimate results
depend to a large extent upon people and their attitudes, including
particularly those in key positions (most of whom take an oath to
uphold the Constitution of the United States). There are many others,
59. Ibid. But cf. Lonesome v. Maxwell, 23 U.S.L. WEEx 2057 (D. Md. Aug. 3,
1954), decided on July 27, 1954 in which the Federal District Court for Mary-
land refused to enjoin segregation at Maryland's public bathing beaches and
swimming pools. The Court felt that the School Segregation Cases show "the
way the wind is blowing" but felt that there was some significance in the re-
mand for consideration in the Louisville Park case rather than outright re-
versal, and that it was bound by Fourth Circuit decisions on segregation in
recreational facilities.
60. See Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 68 Sup. Ct. 184, 92 L. Ed. 76 (1947).
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of course, who take seriously the rights established by the Constitu-
tion and who are willing to participate in the thought and effort con-
tinually required to bridge the gap between the reality of human and
governmental relationships and the constitutional ideal.
